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Introduction
The trade literature typically assumes that exporters sell directly to consumers. Throughout history, however, intermediaries have played an important role in international exchange. Greif (1993) , for instance, analyzes in detail the complex relations between merchants and their overseas agents in the 11th-century Mediterranean economy [see Peng (1998) for an account since 1600]. In his analysis of retail trade in England between 1550 and 1700, Berger (1980) notes that during that time retailers assumed an important role in the distribution of internationally traded goods.
Reliable data about the share of trade handled by intermediaries is hard to come by. In the early 1990s, Japan's trading companies handled 40% of Japanese exports according to the Economist (1995), while US export management companies handled about 10% of US manufactured exports according to Root (1994) . However, these shares do not capture all the intermediaries operating in international markets. More broadly, Rauch (1999) estimates that in 1990 about 65% of international trade was in di¤erentiated products for which there were no organized exchanges or reference prices (up from 55% in 1970). It is mainly with respect to these products that intermediaries can be expected to play an important role. Not only do intermediaries match international buyers and sellers, they typically also provide a variety of services ranging from providing information about markets and competing products to foreign manufacturers, to providing pre-or after-sale services to local consumers. The increasing role of intermediaries is also consistent with the general trend of export service outsourcing.
The relationship between manufacturers and intermediaries, however, is not without problems. For instance, it is well known that in imperfectly competitive markets successive markups by manufacturers and intermediaries (double marginalization) create ine¢ciencies within the vertical structure. The inability of manufacturers to observe their intermediaries' sales e¤ort may create moral hazard problems. And the presence of market uncertainty may lead to a problem of allocating risk between parties with di¤erent degrees of risk aversion. To deal with such problems, manufacturers and intermediaries typically write contracts. that: "... as government barriers to market integration disappear, we can expect that private anticompetitive practices will assume increased importance. And vertical restrictions will be an important and complicated issue for competition enforcers." By endogenizing the use of vertical restraints, this paper is able to investigate whether there is any validity to these speculations. The vertical restraint we focus on is an exclusive territory (ET) clause, which implies that a manufacturer uses an exclusive intermediary (hereafter called a retailer) in a given country or region. There are at least two reasons why ET is an interesting vertical restraint to examine in an international context. First, it is the area of ET where the United States and the European Union (EU) di¤er the most in their anti-trust policies. In the United
States, vertical restraints-and especially ET-are viewed as essentially e¢cient and thus harmless; the main argument is that they alleviate free riding among retailers in the provision of customer services. The opposite is true in Europe. At least until recently, the EU saw ET as anti-competitive and as restricting trade, thereby undermining the forces of economic integration, especially when the exclusive territories correspond to member countries. 2 It is thus the role of international trade and economic integration that di¤erentiates the United
States and the EU as far as the treatment of ET is concerned. 3 Second, the enforcement of an ET clause, which requires a suppression of intrabrand competition across assigned territories, appears to be relatively easy at the international level. Trade policy is shown in this paper to have non-trivial e¤ects on the trade-o¤ between reducing price competition and insuring retailers, and hence on the equilibrium choice of ET.
In particular, we identify conditions under which trade liberalization leads to an increased use of ET in equilibrium, and other conditions under which it induces manufacturers to stop using ET. In the former case, manufacturers counteract a reduction in government barriers to trade with a private anti-competitive arrangement. We also demonstrate that this private arrangement, namely ET, may have worse e¤ects than the initial government barrier so that interbrand competition, trade volume and welfare may decrease with trade liberalization.
The paper hence identi…es circumstances under which competition policy, when it prohibits ET, may have a clear role to play in a freer trade environment.
This paper is linked to the literature in the following way. To the best of our knowledge, Fargeix and Perlo¤ (1989) is the …rst trade paper in which a manufacturer (in their case only the domestic one) sells through an agent. They are interested in how trade liberalization a¤ects this agent's incentive to provide customer services, and hence treat contracts as exogenous. 4 Although there are many recent books and papers about the role of competition policy in international markets, most deal with mergers and cartels rather than with vertical restraints. 5 The present paper is, however, closely linked to the literature in Industrial
Organization on vertical restraints. This is especially the case with respect to Rey and Tirole's (1986) classic paper on endogenous vertical restraints, and Rey and Stiglitz's (1995) paper on the anti-competitive e¤ect of ET.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we build a model with one domestic and one foreign manufacturer. In Section 3, we …rst derive the equilibrium prices, outputs and pro…ts for each combination of contracts selected by the two manufacturers, and then show that interbrand competition generally decreases with the use of ET.
In Section 4, we derive the equilibrium choice of contracts given the exogenous parameters of the model. In Section 5, we use simulations to investigate the e¤ects of trade liberalization on the equilibrium choice of contracts, the volume of trade and on welfare. We also discuss the role of competition policy. Section 6 provides extensions, and Section 7 concludes.
The Model
Consider a domestic manufacturer (h) and a foreign manufacturer (f) who produce imperfectly substitutable goods for sale in the home market. Consumer demand for product i is given by 4 Another recent paper in which manufacturers use agents is Richardson (1999b) . But in this paper, too, contracts are exogenous. 5 Bhagwati and Hudec (1996) recently edited two volumes on a variety of issues linked to the harmonization of policies, including competition policy. Recent papers more speci…cally on international aspects of competition policy include Francois and Horn (1998) , Head and Ries (1997) , Horn and Levinsohn (1997) , Levinsohn (1994) , Motta and Onida (1997) , Nagaoka (1998) and Richardson (1999a The production technology exhibits constant marginal costs. We denote manufacturer i's marginal cost by c i , i = h; f: To distribute their products to consumers both manufacturers require the services of intermediaries. In keeping with tradition, we refer to these intermediaries as retailers, even though their activities may also cover other distribution stages. We assume that there are many competitive retailers serving the home market and that the retail activity itself is costless. Under ET, a manufacturer picks one of these retailers to be his exclusive agent; 6 we refer to the home (foreign) manufacturer's exclusive retailer as retailer h (f ). We assume that manufacturers can commit themselves to assign ET and that this choice, once made, is observed by all …rms.
In addition to the wholesale price, retailers potentially face a cost arising from trade barriers. This cost is represented by a random variable t and measured in per-unit terms.
We treat it as a resource cost incurred by the retailers. 7 It is common knowledge for all agents in the economy that t is distributed over the interval [t ¡ ; t + ] with mean t e and variance ¾ 2 t . Both manufacturers and retailers face uncertainty about t at the contracting stage, but retailers later observe the realization of t before choosing what price to charge consumers.
The variance ¾ 2 t can be interpreted as the degree of uncertainty of the trade barrier. In this paper, we limit the choice of contracts to 'ET' and 'no ET'. To make sure that manufacturers cannot discriminate among retailers or propose other contractual arrangements (e.g. retail price maintenance), we follow Rey and Tirole (1986) and Rey and Stiglitz 6 Alternatively, we could assume that the home market is divided into a …nite number of 'territories', such as federal states or metropolitan areas, and that each 'territory' has a large number of competitive retailers.
This would have no e¤ect on our results. 7 Our welfare conclusions would not be a¤ected in any qualitatively important way, if we were to treat t as a revenue-generating tari¤.
(1995) in assuming that manufacturers observe only the amount supplied to retailers and whether a given retailer carries a product, but do not observe the quantity sold by the retailers, their pro…t and retail prices. Moreover, the manufacturers cannot refuse to deal ex post.
They can, however, set a franchise fee, since manufacturers observe whether the product is carried by a retailer. Hence, a contract always speci…es a wholesale price w i and a franchise fee F i (i = h; f). 8 Complicating the choice of contract in this uncertain trade environment is the fact that, while manufacturers themselves are risk neutral, retailers are risk averse. For analytical tractability, we assume that retailers are extremely risk averse; what this implies will be discussed below.
The assumption that the realization of t is not observed by the manufacturers is important: it implies that manufacturers cannot specify contracts conditional on the realization of t. They hence have no direct (i.e. contractual) means of insuring retailers. The nontransparent barriers listed in Appendix 1 …t this assumption. These barriers are typically product-speci…c and, insofar as retailers (or wholesalers) act as importers of the foreign products they sell, manufacturers have no reason to know the realization of t before the products are actually sold. 9 The strategic interactions between the manufacturers and between them and their retailers can be summarized by a three-stage game. In the …rst stage, each manufacturer chooses which contract to have with its retailer(s). Manufacturers have two options: assign ET to their retailers or, alternatively, sell to retailers without such a clause. In the second stage, manufacturers choose their wholesale prices and franchise fees given the option chosen in the …rst stage. In the third stage, retailers learn the realization of t and choose their retail 8 Rey and Stiglitz (1995) show that ET, in itself, does not require a franchise fee. However, they demonstrate that it is a dominant strategy for the manufacturers to adopt such a franchise fee along with ET and thus we consider this case only. 9 What is important for our results is that manufacturers cannot write complete insurance contracts.
Exchange-rate movements, which otherwise act in a similar way as changes in trade barriers (see Feenstra (1989)), do not …t our interpretation of t, at least to the extent that it is possible to perfectly hedge against such movements.
prices accordingly. Consumers then make their purchase decisions. In the next two sections, we characterize the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game. If a retailer has been granted an exclusive territory, he faces the following maximization problem:
where t f = t and t h = 0. The …rst-order condition to this problem is
This condition implicitly de…nes retailer i's best-response function, which we write as p i = R i (p j ; w i ; t i ): Given our assumptions about the demand function, it is straightforward to
That is, the best-response function is upward sloping, and i's price response is increasing in his wholesale price and the trade barrier he faces.
There are four possible sets of equilibrium retail prices, depending on each manufacturer's choice of contract. As we have already seen, retailer i's price when manufacturer i does not impose ET is p i = w i + t i regardless of j's choice. If manufacturer i uses ET but j does 8 not, then retailer i's equilibrium price is obtained by using p j = w j + t j in (3). If both manufacturers have chosen ET, (3) de…nes a pair of best-response functions for retailers i and j, and the equilibrium retail prices are obtained by solving this system. Below, we will write retailer i's price as p i (w i ; w j ; t) for i = h; f , where it is implicitly understood that this price also depends on the contracts chosen by the two manufacturers.
The fact that retailers are risk averse has no e¤ect on their choice of price, since this choice comes after they have observed the realization of t. But it may a¤ect their decision of whether to represent a manufacturer, since this choice is made before they learn the value of t.
We have to distinguish between two cases depending on whether the manufacturer uses ET.
If he does not use it, then intrabrand competition guarantees that the retailers representing this manufacturer earn zero pro…ts for every realization of t-they simply pass on any cost to the consumer. In order for the retailers to be willing to represent the manufacturer in this case the franchise fee must be zero.
If the manufacturer imposes ET, he exposes his exclusive retailer to risk. Ex post, the realization of t is only observed by the retailer. This means that the manufacturer cannot make the franchise fee and the wholesale price contingent on the realized value of t. The retailer's ex-post pro…t therefore varies with this value, and he must be compensated for taking on the associated risk if he is to accept the manufacturer's contract. The assumption of extreme risk aversion allows us to capture this compensation, or risk premium, in an analytically tractable way. 10 In particular, this assumption implies that the retailer only accepts the manufacturer's contract, if doing so leaves him with a non-negative pro…t under the "worst" realization of t.
Letting t v i denote the worst possible realization of t for retailer i = h; f, it is easily shown that t
Using (2), we then observe that under ET the highest franchise 10 Our results only depend on the fact that under ET a manufacturer must pay his retailer a risk premium, and not on the speci…c form that this risk premium takes under the assumption of extreme risk aversion. 11 To see this consider the worst realization of t for retailer f; assuming that wholesale prices and the franchise fee are given. If h does not have ET, an increase in t raises retailer f's cost but leaves p h and the residual demand for f 's product unchanged; so the higher is t, the lower is retailer f 's pro…t. If h has fee the manufacturer is able to charge (assuming that the retailer's payo¤ from his best outside alternative is normalized to zero) is
where I f = 1 and I h = 0.
The choice of wholesale prices
Consider now the manufacturers' choice of wholesale prices. We start with the case where both have chosen ET. Manufacturer i's problem is to …nd the w i that maximizes his expected pro…t, which consists of his expected wholesale pro…t and the franchise fee. To simplify the analysis, we assume that expected demand satis…es
, as would, for instance, be the case if demand were linear. 12 We can then write the maximization problem as follows:
Setting the derivative with respect to w i equal to zero, we obtain
where we have simpli…ed the notation by using D i (t e )´D i (p i (w i ; w j ; t e ); p j (w i ; w j ; t e )),
Applying the envelope theorem, we can ET, any increase in p f in response to a rise in t will be accompanied by an increase in p h ; this follows from the strategic complementarity of retail prices. However, since dp h =dp f < 1 (see Appendix 2), p h will rise be less than p f and so demand for good f must fall. In addition, note that when manufacturer f uses ET, @p f =@t < 1 (see Appendix 2) . This together with falling demand means that retailer f 's pro…t is decreasing in t. A fall in t a¤ects retailer h indirectly via a decrease in p f . A lower p f leads to lower residual demand for good h and a smaller pro…t for retailer h. 12 More generally this holds whenever t enters expected demand with an exponent of one.
10 write the third term as follows:
Using (7) in (6) gives:
This …rst-order condition illustrates three important e¤ects of the choice of w i , namely an insurance, a direct and a strategic e¤ect. The …rst term (in parentheses) represents the insurance e¤ect. An increase in w i raises pro…t from wholesaling at rate D i (t e ). However, it also increases the cost of the retailer and thus decreases the manufacturer's pro…t from the franchise fee at rate
Intuitively, raising w i is bene…cial since it helps transfer some of the risk from the risk-averse retailer to the risk-neutral manufacturer. 14 The second term is the standard direct e¤ect of w i on wholesale pro…t. The third term (in square brackets) is the total strategic e¤ect: an increase in w i raises p j , since @p j =@w i = (dp j =dp i )(@p i =@w i ) > 0, and hence indirectly the residual demand for good i by
A unit increase in residual demand raises the wholesale pro…t by (w i ¡ c i ) and the franchise fee by
Best-reply function (8) together with its counterpart for manufacturer j de…nes the equilibrium wholesale prices when both manufacturers have chosen ET. If manufacturer i does not use ET but j does, i's retailers are fully insured through intrabrand competition, but he can no longer levy a franchise fee. His …rst-order condition is hence given by
which is identical to (6) except that @F i =@w i = 0: Manufacturer j's …rst-order condition changes, too. He still levies a franchise fee, but no longer realizes a strategic e¤ect since i's 13 We can use the envelope theorem here, since in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium a retailer's choice of price must be a best response in all subgames following the move of nature, which picks t 2 [t ¡ ; t + ]; t v i is one of nature's possible choices.
14 If the retailer were risk neutral,
retailers price at marginal cost and therefore @p i (¢)=@w j = 0. The new …rst-order condition
which is the same as (8), except that the strategic e¤ect has disappeared (and i has been replaced with j). Hence when one manufacturer chooses ET and the other does not, equilibrium wholesale prices are de…ned by (9) and (10).
If both manufacturers choose 'no ET', the e¤ect from the franchise fee and the strategic e¤ect disappear from (8), leaving
Equilibrium wholesale prices are then given by the system of equations (11).
Below it will prove convenient to denote a contract choice by a single letter: E for 'ET' and N for 'no ET'. A pair of contract choices can then be written as (E; E); (E; N);
, where the …rst letter refers to the domestic manufacturer's contract. We denote the equilibrium wholesale prices and corresponding manufacturer pro…ts in the four possible subgames following the manufacturers' choice of contracts by w , where i; j = h; f and k; l = E; N . In the next section we ask how the choice of wholesale prices a¤ects retail prices and thus the degree of interbrand competition across the di¤erent contract scenarios.
Contracts and interbrand competition
We know from Rey and Stiglitz (1995) that in the absence of uncertainty and with two symmetric manufacturers the simultaneous adoption of ET by both leads to higher retail prices. For the purpose of the current paper, however, it is important to generalize this result in three directions, namely by allowing for cost asymmetries between …rms, uncertainty and risk-averse retailers, and asymmetries in the contract choice. The following proposition is proved formally in Appendix 3: What is the intuition for these results? Consider …rst part (a). Suppose manufacturer j adopts ET. This frees up the link between his wholesale price and the price choice of his retailer. Manufacturer i (who does not have ET) now realizes that if he raises the wholesale price and hence the retail price of his product, j's retailer will respond by raising his price as well; this is the strategic e¤ect given by the last term of (9). Hence for any wholesale price set by j, i chooses a higher wholesale price than before, leading to a higher retail price for both products.
When switching to ET, manufacturer j encounters a double-marginalization problem.
He can alleviate this problem by decreasing w j and using the franchise fee to capture the pro…t of his exclusive retailer. In particular, retail price p j would be the same as in the absence of ET, if w j were set equal to marginal cost c j . However, j …nds it optimal to set w j > c j , since a higher wholesale price provides at least some insurance for the retailer (this can be formally seen by noticing that the …rst term in (10) is positive). This e¤ect implies that, ceteris paribus, j's exclusive retailer does increase his retail price when manufacturer j adopts ET. Together with the strategic e¤ect for manufacturer i, this means that the equilibrium expected retail prices necessarily increase when one manufacturer adopts ET.
If both manufacturers switch from no ET to ET, then both can exploit the strategic e¤ect and both must insure their retailer at least partially by keeping wholesale price above marginal cost. In other words, the above e¤ects play for both manufacturers and, as a result, the equilibrium retail prices must unambiguously increase as well.
Part (b) of the proposition indicates that there is some possible ambiguity about the change in expected retail prices when one manufacturer already has ET and the other one switches from no ET to ET. This is the case at least with signi…cant uncertainty about the barrier to trade. The ambiguity does not come from the retail price response for the good produced by the manufacturer with ET. In e¤ect, with the switch in contracts by his rival, this manufacturer can now exploit a strategic e¤ect which, ceteris paribus, increases his wholesale and retail prices (compare (10) and (8)). Rather the ambiguity comes from the price response of the manufacturer who adopts ET. With uncertainty about t, the switch to ET introduces an insurance e¤ect (which, ceteris paribus, would lead to a higher retail price), but it also decreases the strategic e¤ect (which tends to reduce the retail price).
This reduction in the strategic e¤ect may or may not be o¤set by the insurance e¤ect. If the retailers were risk-neutral, the strategic e¤ect would not be a¤ected by the change in contract. Hence a su¢cient condition for the equilibrium retail prices to increase is that the degree of uncertainty is small.
The Equilibrium Choice of Contracts
Having characterized the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices for the four possible contract combinations, we now turn to the …rst stage of the game, namely the manufacturers' choice of contract. We can represent this decision problem by the following strategic-form game:
The strategy combination (E; E) forms a Nash equilibrium of this stage game, if ¦ 
Two polar cases
Whether a given contract constitutes a best response (or even a dominant strategy) depends on a trade-o¤ between the insurance property of the contract and its e¤ect on interbrand competition. As we have shown above, the use of ET tends to reduce competition (i.e. increase retail prices). However, since this contract has inferior insurance properties relative to 'no ET', a manufacturer uses ET only when the gain from decreased interbrand competition outweighs the risk premium that he has to 'pay' the risk-averse retailer. Before examining this trade-o¤ in more detail it is useful to …rst look at two extreme situations, one in which there is no uncertainty about t, and another in which there is no interbrand competition.
Proposition 2
If there is no uncertainty about trade barriers, barriers are non-prohibitive, and goods are substitutes, each manufacturer's dominant strategy is to choose ET.
This result is a corollary of Proposition 3 in Rey and Stiglitz (1995) and easily proved using the arguments laid out in the previous section. By adopting ET a manufacturer frees up the retail price from his wholesale price thereby allowing his rival to exploit a strategic e¤ect. In particular, the rival will choose a higher wholesale price, since he now realizes that the associated increase in his good's retail price will be accompanied by an increase in the other good's retail price. Hence adopting ET leads to more collusion and is desirable whether or not the rival himself has adopted ET.
Proposition 3
If trade barriers are uncertain and the degree of product substitutability is su¢ciently small, 'no ET' is a dominant strategy for each manufacturer. Moreover, independent of the degree of product substitutability, 'no ET' is a dominant strategy for the domestic manufacturer, if the expected barrier to trade is su¢ciently close to the prohibitive level.
The …rst part of this proposition is a corollary of Rey and Tirole (1986)'s Proposition
2, where the result is proved for the case where the degree of substitutability is zero. By continuity, the result also holds for a su¢ciently small degree of substitutability. When products are poor substitutes, …rms do not have to worry about rivalry but only about the insurance property of the contract. Under 'no ET', retailers are fully insured against risk since they earn zero pro…t in any state of nature. The second part of Proposition 3 follows from the …rst. When the expected level of the trade barrier is high, the domestic …rm again faces little price competition, and thus chooses 'no ET' to insure its retailers.
The preceding arguments point to three factors that in ‡uence the trade-o¤ between reducing competition and providing insurance, and hence determine the choice of contract.
They include the degree of product substitutability, the degree of uncertainty of trade barriers, and the expected level of these barriers. To identify the role of each of these factors we need to assign parameters to them.
A parameterized model
Assume that demand takes the following form:
Parameter b re ‡ects the degree of product substitutability. If b = 0, then the products are not substitutable and each producer acts as a monopolist; when b = 1; demand depends only on the price di¤erence.
Further assume that c i = 0 for i = h; f , and that t is distributed over the interval
. Parameter v then measures the 'degree of uncertainty' about t, whereas t e allows us to track changes in the expected level of trade barriers, keeping the degree of uncertainty constant. To compute welfare, we make the additional assumption that t is uniformly distributed; in this case, the variance of t, ¾ 2 t , is equal to
.
From the discussion in the previous section it is clear that, given uncertain trade barriers, both manufacturers will adopt 'no ET' for su¢ciently low values of b, and both will choose
ET for values of b close enough to one, unless v and/or t e are very high. Hence, the most interesting trade-o¤s in the choice of contract occur for intermediate values of b. This is the case we focus on below. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium contracts that arise for di¤erent values of t e and v for b = 0:8. 15 When v is small, the risk premium manufacturers have to pay their exclusive retailers is small and both adopt ET in order to reduce price competition. When v is large relative to t e , the risk premium is big and both manufacturers choose 'no ET', despite 15 All …gures in this paper were generated with Maple using the parameterized model described above, and a grid of at least 95 values each for t e and v. We consider only values such that t e¸v to make sure that trade barriers are non-negative for all realizations of t.
substantial price competition. Finally when t e and v are both substantial, the domestic manufacturer faces little price competition and hence chooses 'no ET' to insure his retailers.
Interestingly, however, the foreign manufacturer's best response is to adopt ET: the high level of the trade barrier reduces the variation in his retailer's pro…t margin, thus helping to insure him. This allows the foreign manufacturer to adopt ET to limit price competition with the domestic rival.
[Insert Figure 1 about here] These consequences are explored in the next section.
The E¤ects of Trade Liberalization
We . But as Figure 1 shows, a reduction in t e eventually leads to a switch in contract by at least one manufacturer. 16 When v (and hence the risk premium an exclusive agent would have to be paid) is small, the domestic manufacturer eventually reacts to the decrease in t e by adopting ET while the foreign manufacturer keeps ET. As we know from Proposition 1, this change in contract causes a jump in equilibrium retail prices when v is small. Hence, at this switch, manufacturers are replacing trade barriers with private anticompetitive arrangements. We have thus identi…ed circumstances under which the suspicions of antitrust authorities we mentioned in the introduction prove to be correct. However, we can also identify a situation in which trade liberalization prompts manufacturers to abandon private anticompetitive arrangements. When v is high, it is the foreign manufacturer who moves from ET to 'no ET', whereas the domestic manufacturer retains 'no ET': as t e falls, the retailer carrying the foreign product faces a greater variability in pro…t and, since v is high, has to be insured by changing the contract to 'no ET'. In this case, Proposition 1 tells us that equilibrium retail prices drop at the point where the switch occurs. Trade liberalization in this case boosts competition in two ways, namely by the traditional e¤ect of forcing retailers to lower price, and by inducing manufacturers to stop using ET.
Similar switches in contracts can be generated by decreasing the degree of uncertainty of the trade barrier (i.e., by reducing v holding t e constant). Since such a reduction directly reduces the need to insure retailers, both manufacturers eventually adopt ET.
Next, we turn to the impact of theses contract changes on expected domestic welfare. To examine this impact we must explicitly de…ne the preferences of a representative domestic consumer that we had previously only characterized by his demand functions (12) . Assume that they are given by the following quasi-linear utility function:
where x i denotes the consumption of manufacturer i's product, y the consumption of the numeraire good, and b¸0. Denoting income by m, the consumer's budget constraint is
It is easily veri…ed that maximizing (13) subject to (14) and inverting the resulting …rst-order conditions yields the demand functions in (12 and from the change in the variance term in consumer surplus. 18 The discrete jumps in expected domestic welfare that occur when the equilibrium contracts change are illustrated in Figure 2 , which plots welfare as a function of t e and v for b = 0:8. Figure 2 indicates that moving from (N; E) to (N; N) leads to a discrete improvement in expected welfare. When trade liberalization instead leads to (E; E), there is 17 Under ET manufacturers set their franchise fees so as to extract the pro…ts obtained by retailers under the 'worst' realization of t; so retailers expect to receive zero pro…ts. However, since the probability that t takes on this value is in…nitely small, retailers earn pure pro…ts ex post. Our formulation of ex-ante social welfare is also in line with the Industrial Organization literature [see Rey and Tirole (1986) ]. For further details on ex-ante and ex-post welfare see Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) . 18 Even though the representative consumer is risk neutral, expected consumer surplus depends on the variance of t; ¾ 2 t . With linear demands, consumer surplus is increasing in ¾ 2 t ; but the coe¢cient associated with ¾ a discrete drop in expected welfare. The …gure also indicates that the e¤ects on expected domestic welfare of changes in contracts may be quite large compared to the e¤ects of even signi…cant trade liberalization; this is re ‡ected by the fact that the surfaces for any given contract combination are relatively ‡at, whereas the discrete jumps when contract changes occur are relatively big. 19 For instance, it can be shown that for v = 0:2 the fall in expected welfare that occurs when the domestic …rm switches from 'no ET' to ET is so large that even complete trade liberalization cannot o¤set the associated expected welfare loss.
[Insert Figure 2 about here] However, insofar as our simulations show world welfare to be much less sensitive to switches 19 The shape and spacing of the iso-welfare contours indicate, for instance, that the region with (E; E) has a steeper gradient than the region with (N; E).
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in contracts and much more sensitive to trade liberalization than domestic welfare, the need for competition policy is essentially a national one. Hence, in the scenario examined in this paper, there does not seem to be a need for global rules concerning the use of ET. However, at the national level, competition policy and trade liberalization may be complements especially in an environment where barriers to trade are relatively transparent.
Extensions
In this section, we examine how the results or our model would be a¤ected by changes in the underlying assumptions. One of these assumptions is that there is no retailing cost.
This made sure that manufacturers want to use a franchise fee along with ET. As shown by Gal-Or (1991), this is no longer the case in the presence of …xed retailing cost. In this case, linear pricing with ET may be the only equilibrium especially when products are close substitutes and retailing costs are high. The advantage of linear pricing is that it represents an even greater commitment to raise prices than using a franchise fee, and this is especially pro…table when products are close substitutes. The disadvantage is that it is more di¢cult for manufacturers to capture the retailer's pro…t than when a franchise fee is used, but the foregone pro…t is low when the retailing cost is high. Of course, …xed retailing cost are not consistent with marginal-cost pricing under 'no ET'. Insofar as the same conclusion holds with variable retailing costs (as claimed by Gal-Or) or by a combination of both types of retailing costs giving rise to U-shaped average retailing cost curves, it indicates that ET and the anti-competitive e¤ect it brings cannot be expected to be systematically associated with franchise fee payments between retailers and manufacturers.
It might be argued that the domestic manufacturer should have a better knowledge of the barrier to trade than the foreign manufacturer. Given the nature of the barrier, it is probably extreme to assume it would know about it at the same time as the retailers.
Still, this constitutes a useful benchmark. In this case, the contract between a domestic manufacturer and its retailers can be made conditional on the realization of t. The domestic manufacturer has little need for competition as it can now insure its retailers while granting them exclusive territory. In other words, ET becomes a dominant strategy for the domestic manufacturer. From Proposition 1 we know that the foreign manufacturer bene…ts from ET set by the domestic manufacturer, and he might therefore place more weight on the insurance motive. We can thus expect the foreign manufacturer to use 'no ET' for a wider set of parameters than when both manufacturers do not know t. An equilibrium with (E; N)
should then also be observed for a larger parameter range. However, as t e falls we should still observe a switch to (E; E) when v is small. by the risk-averse retailer. Unless speci…c contractual arrangements among merging parties are set to shift the risk toward the production unit of the merging entity, merging as a joint-pro…t maximization mechanism cannot completely insure the retailer. Similarly, ET helps decrease intrabrand competition precisely because the retailer plays a key role as an independent intermediary. A merger produces the opposite result: it eliminates the retailer as an intermediary and the merging …rm simply sets a retail price. There is thus more competition among the two manufacturers once they have merged with their retailers than if they do not merge and use ET. This suggests that merger, as an alternative contractual arrangement, would not dominate the contracts analyzed in this paper.
Conclusions
In this paper, manufacturers pursue two objectives: they want to insure their risk-averse retailers against the e¤ects of uncertain barriers to trade, and they want to minimize interbrand We conclude that, in this model, a concern expressed by anti-trust authorities in the United States and Europe is at least partly justi…ed: trade liberalization may induce manufacturers to use private anti-competitive arrangements, such as exclusive territories. Hence, if anything, competition policy limiting the use of such a clause must be stronger, not weaker, with economic integration. However, the results of this paper also suggest that such a competition policy cannot be applied as a per se rule. Indeed, the e¤ects of lower barriers to trade depend to a large extent on their initial level, on their degree of transparency, and on the degree of substitutability between foreign and domestic products. For instance, there is no need to be tougher on exclusive territory clauses when products are highly di¤erentiated or when products are similar but barrier to trade are relatively uncertain. A tougher competition policy, however, becomes desirable when foreign and domestic products are similar and the initial barrier to trade is high and relatively transparent.
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There are, of course, many possible channels through which …rms might react to attenuate the e¤ects of trade liberalization. In this paper, we have claimed that contractual arrangements should be considered as an important candidate. By inducing manufacturers to switch to an exclusive-territory clause when barriers to trade decrease or become more transparent, our approach may contribute to explaining why the e¤ects of the EU's 1992 Single Market
Initiative have been more modest than expected, or why o¢cial e¤orts to improve market access in Japan had somewhat disappointing results. Still, this paper represents only a …rst step and much further research, both at the theoretical and at the empirical level, is needed to gain a better understanding of the role of contractual arrangements in international trade. 
Korea: (all from USTR (1998))
Import clearance for non-perishable agricultural products typically takes two to four weeks and sometimes up to two months. There exist mandatory incubating testing for some products including Florida fruits. The law requires labels to include manufacturing process information and ingredient listed by percentage for all ingredients. It also requires labeling on imported products to show the import price in Korean Won, which has to be updated every three months to account for exchange rate ‡uctuations.
Arbitrary and sudden changes in custom classi…cation and border treatment (i.e., the tari¤ level) are often reported. Custom clearance applications can be rejected on administrative grounds.
Korea requires pre-approval for cosmetics, food additives, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electronics, and personal communication services. It requires annual testing of cosmetic products and batch testing for each shipment, including animal testing.
Pharmaceutical companies report that for products developed outside Korea …nal-step clinical trials cannot be started in Korea before they are completed in another country.
There is then a 145 days delay in registration before those trials can begin, thus delaying introduction of new foreign products by two years.
In the auto industry, the reclassi…cation of minivans has increased taxes (1995). There is redundant vehicle testing beyond the initial type-approval certi…cation process. Korea blends international certi…cation standards making it impossible for importers to homologate vehicles without incurring cost to modify and test vehicles for export to Korea.
All radio and television advertising must be submitted in its …nal fully produced form for censorship. Given the unpredictability of the process, this adds considerable risk and cost of introducing new products.
United States:
In April 1999, Canada accused the US of illegally manipulating international customs rules to thwart Canadian lumber exports by reclassifying siding boards so that they fall under the quotas set in the 1996 Canada-US lumber agreement. Siding is the third major category of Canadian lumber to face reclassi…cation in the past year. The US successfully reclassi…ed pre-drilled studs and is proposing doing the same with notched studs (Globe and Mail (1999)).
On Jan 4, 1989, the Custom Service announced that jeeps and vans were re-classi…ed as trucks increasing the tari¤ rate from 2.5% to 25% e¤ective immediately. The Treasury Department then modi…ed the change in classi…cation by announcing that two-door vehicles were trucks but four-door sport vehicles and jeeps were automobiles (Bovard (1991) ).
On Dec. 6, 1988, Customs announced that steel wire rope with beckets was re-classi…ed from an uncontrolled tari¤ category to a tari¤ classi…cation restricted by a Voluntary Restraint Agreements signed a few years earlier (Bovard (1991) ).
On July 2, 1987, Customs announced a retroactive 2,500% tari¤ increase on computer parts (Bovard (1991) ).
In 1988, Customs increased the tari¤ levied on a shipment of 33,000 girl's ski jackets from 10.6% to 35% because the jackets had small strips of corduroy on the sleeves amounting to 2% of the jacket's composition (Bovard (1991) ).
In 1988, Customs prohibited the imports of a shipment of 30,000 tennis shoes from Indonesia, because the shoe boxes contained an extra pair of shoelaces (Bovard (1991) ).
European Union:
In February 1988, the EC changed its requirement for a product to qualify as being 'European'. Concerning integrated circuits, the EC changed its rule of origin by rede…ning the term 'place of last substantial transformation' from 'place of assembly and testing' to 'place of di¤usion' (i.e., the state at which circuits are placed on a semiconductor wafer) (USTR (1989)).
New standards for sterile medical devices and diagnostic products in Germany requires storage of pharmaceutical …le samples at the importer's site rather than the exporting company (USTR (1989)).
In 1982, France decreed that all VCRs imported from Japan must pass through the (completely overworked) customs o¢ce in Poitiers (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997).
Appendix 2
We …rst show that under ET retail prices are strategic complements, i.e., that retailers' bestreply functions are upward sloping. Retailer i's best-reply function is given by (3) . Using the implicit function theorem to compute its slope, we have dp i dp j
The denominator of (15) is negative and hence sign Ã dp i dp j
Also note that dp i =dp j < 1:
Next we demonstrate that, under ET, @p i =@w i < 1, which means that retailer i absorbs part of any increase in the wholesale price (or t i ). Totally di¤erentiating the system of …rst-order conditions in (3), we obtain 
4 dp i dp j 27 Using Cramer's Rule, we can compute
where
by the assumptions imposed on demand. Hence @p i =@w i < 1; if
or
which holds given the assumptions about demand.
10 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1 (a) If manufacturers i and j have 'no ET', wholesale prices are given by (11) . Note that under 'no ET' retailers price at marginal cost so that we can replace w i in (11) by p i ¡ t e i to obtain:
Suppose that j switches to ET. Wholesale prices are then given by (9) and (10) . Using (9) we obtain i's …rst-order condition: 
Since the strategic e¤ect in (20) is positive, j's switch to ET means that for any w j manufacturer i chooses a higher w i , thereby driving up p i . Now …x w i and consider what w j would have to be to keep p j unchanged when j adopts ET. Under ET, p j is determined by retailer j's …rst-order condition (3). Comparing (3) and 28 (19) we …nd that holding p j …xed would require that w j = c j : However, manufacturer j's …rst-order condition under ET, (10) , indicates that his best response to w i involves w j > c j ;
since under risk aversion D j (t e ) ¡ D j (t v j ) > 0. Hence for any given w i ; j's choice of w j implies that p j is higher than under 'no ET'. We conclude from this and the argument in the previous paragraph that if j adopts ET both p i and p j go up.
Next consider what happens if i and j both introduce ET so that equation system (8) determines wholesale prices. Using the same reasoning as in the preceding paragraph, we can establish that the only way to keep retail prices unchanged when there is a switch from 'no ET' to ET is for both manufacturers to set wholesale price equal to marginal cost, (b) If j has ET but i does not, wholesale prices are given by (9) and (10) . Consider what happens if i adopts ET so that wholesale prices are given by (8) . To keep retail price p j constant for a given w i , j would have to continue setting w j according to (10) . But a comparison of (10) and (8) shows that j wants to raise w j due to the positive strategic e¤ect in (8) , and hence p j must rise for any given w i . Since dp i =dp j > 0 under ET, this e¤ect tends to raise p i as well.
Next take w j as given and consider how w i would have to change to keep p i constant when i adopts ET. Under 'no ET' p i (t e i ) = w i ¡ t e i and @p i (t e )=@w i = 1; using this in (9) 
This condition, however, is not always satis…ed. Under linear demand, for instance, the derivatives in (24) do not depend on the level of t so that the condition reduces to
But we can verify that this inequality does not hold for either the domestic or the foreign …rm. The domestic …rm does not face any trade barrier, so (25) simpli…es to p h (t
which is a contradiction. For the foreign …rm we note that, since @p f (¢)=@t = @p f (¢)=@w f < 1 (see Appendix 2) and t + > t e , p f (t + ) ¡ t + > p f (t e ) ¡ t e f is also a contradiction. Since all e¤ects other than the change in the strategic e¤ect imply an increase in retail prices as i shifts to ET, a su¢cient condition for such an increase is that jt Trade Volume
